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HUMAN RESOURCES

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LABOR

TIGHTER CONTROL OVER CONSTRUCTION WAGES ADVOCATED

Moscow FINANSY SSSR in Russian No 1, Jan 83 pp 63-65

[Article by S. D. Movshovich, chief of the Lithuanian Republic Office of the All-Union Bank for Financing Capital Investments: "Tighten Up the Control Over the Expenditure of Wages in Construction Organizations"]

[Text] The monitoring of the expenditure of the wage funds in construction is one of the most important tasks of the All-Union Bank for Financing Capital Investments, which ensues from the decisions of the 26th party congress. The saving of the wage funds in construction is being ensured first of all by the proper organization of construction and installation work at the construction sites, its mechanization, the better use of manpower and the increase of labor productivity.

During the years of the 10th Five-Year Plan the organizations of the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Construction did not fulfill the assignments on the increase of labor productivity. In 1981 the ministry coped with this assignment, but 25 percent of the primary organizations did not fulfill the plan of the increase of labor productivity, 18 percent of the construction organizations decreased its level as compared with the preceding year. At the Kaunas House Building Combine, the Shyaulayay House Building Combine, the Elektromontazh Trust and the mechanization trust of the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Construction the increase of the average wage led the increase of labor productivity.

Shortcomings in the organization of construction at the construction sites are one of the basic causes of the overexpenditures of the wage funds. Instances of the idle times of machinery, the untimely supply of materials and the violation of labor discipline were established by checks of the bank. Thus, in October 1981 in Mobile Mechanized Column No 182 of the Kaunasstroy Trust of the Kaunas Meat Combine on the day of the check the brigade of plasterers was idle due to the lack of cement slurry. At the construction site of projects of the enterprise in Kaunas, which was being carried out by the same construction organization, due to the lack of a bulldozer the smoothing of the ground and the unloading of brick were carried out by hand, although at this time bulldozers and truck cranes stood idle at the projects of the named organization. There are many other cases like this.

The Ministry of Construction of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic took urgent steps on the elimination of the shortcomings which had been detected by the Lithuanian Republic Office of the All-Union Bank for Financing Capital Investments.

Organizational and technical measures, which are drawn up within the construction and financial plan, are an important condition for the assurance of the increase of labor productivity. The check of the planning of the indicators on labor, which was made by the All-Union Bank for Financing Capital Investments, showed that in March 1981, as well as in March 1982 a significant number of construction organizations had not completed by this time the drafting of the construction and financial plans, calculations for the substantiation of the indicators of labor were absent at 42 construction organizations of the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Construction. During the first half of 1981 half of the construction organizations did not have organizational and technical measures or they were unspecific and impracticable. The same situation existed in early 1982.

Organizational and technical measures, which do not ensure the prescribed increase of labor productivity, were elaborated in individual organizations. The checks of the All-Union Bank for Financing Capital Investments established that organizational and technical measures were not being implemented at the majority of construction organizations which were not coping with the assignment on the increase of labor productivity. The institutions of the Lithuanian Office of the All-Union Bank for Financing Capital Investments demanded of the construction organizations the elimination of the shortcomings which were detected by the check. The bank posed the question of the improvement of the planning of the indicators on labor, the improvement of the quality and the speeding up of the elaboration of the construction and financial plans and the organizational and technical measures on the increase of labor productivity.

Overexpenditures of the wage fund are also due to excessive payments of wages. In 9 months of 1981 alone a number of violations of financial discipline when paying for labor and paying bonuses were revealed by the checks of the institutions of the bank. At the Shyaulyay House Building Combine 14,000 rubles were illegally spent as a result of additions and the improper crediting of bonuses to workers. At the Khimstroy Trust 22,000 rubles were paid for the elimination of flaws in projects which were turned over during the past year; at the Utena Trust 15,000 rubles were paid and at the Shyaulyay Trust 14,000 rubles were paid for the performance of work which was not stipulated by the planning estimates; at the Vil'nyusstroy Trust 2,000 rubles were spent from the wage fund of the workers for paying supernumerary administrative and managerial personnel. As a whole for the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Construction 403,000 rubles of excessively paid wages, or 7.8 percent of all the checked payments, were detected in 9 months of 1981. The excessive payments were recorded as an excessive payment of wages, that is, were held back from the construction organizations. At the same time the improvement of the economic mechanism in construction should contribute to the elimination of shortcomings of this kind.

The adoption of the indicators of the net output (standard), which was stipulated by the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of 12 July 1979, or another indicator, which reflects more accurately the expenditures of labor, is of great importance. Starting in early 1980 the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Construction began the conducting of an experiment on the use of the indicator of the standard value added. Labor productivity at the construction organizations of the ministry is being measured in accordance with this indicator and wages are being paid in accordance with it as the work is performed. The construction organizations of the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Construction have been conducting such an experiment since 1981.

The use of the new procedure, which makes it possible to evaluate the contribution of each organization, should increase the interest of construction organizations in the accomplishment of the end results of activity instead of their orientation toward the performance of construction and installation work. Both the indicators of the construction organization on labor productivity and the right to the expenditure of the wage fund depended on the level of fulfillment and the amount of construction and installation work. As a result the practice formed, in case of which materials-consuming operations were most profitable. They determined to a decisive extent the increase of labor productivity and the wage fund, without the proper interrelationship with the organization of operations at the construction sites and the dates of the completion and placement into operation of the projects.

Much preliminary work, which also included the recalculation of several tens of thousands of estimated cost sheets, was performed by the construction organizations for the conducting of this experiment.

More than 30,000 standards for all types of estimated cost sheets, which are in effect on the territory of the republic, were elaborated in conformity with the method which was adopted by the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Construction. In accordance with the prevailing recommendations the direct expenditures with the exception of the cost of materials, a portion of the overhead, the planned accumulations, the expenditures on the operation of machines and machinery, the expenditures on temporary buildings and structures and other additional expenditures are a part of the standard value added.

The amounts of the standard value added are determined by the direct conversion of the estimated cost sheets for structural components and types of operations. In 1981 the amounts of the standard value added were calculated according to consolidated indicators, which determine the proportion of the value added within the construction and installation work in estimated prices, by types of operations in conformity with the structure being planned. The detailed conversion of the estimated cost by structural members and types of operations is carried out in the construction organizations already in the process of the work for local operational planning by sections and brigades and the determination of the actually performed amount of work according to the standard value added.

The preliminary results of the conducting of the experiment in the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Construction show that along with other measures the use of the new procedure of determining labor productivity and issuing wages promotes an increase of the interest of the construction organization in the improvement of the ultimate indicators of its activity (percent):

<u>Indicators</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1981</u>
Fulfillment of plan on commodity production of construction.	96	102
Fulfillment of plan on placement of most important projects into operation.	69	96
Fulfillment of plan on placement of living space into operation. . .	96	106
Fulfillment of plan of construction and installation work at start-up projects.	95	103
Increase of labor productivity as compared with preceding year according to standard value added.	--	7.4

The amount of unfinished production with respect to the amount of construction and installation work being performed decreased from 81.8 percent in 1979 to 68.2 percent in 1981. At the same time there are a number of unsolved problems. Thus, at the organizations of the republic Ministry of Construction the proportion of the expenditures on wages in the amount of construction and installation work increased slightly, which is evident from the following data (rubles):

	1979	1980	1981
Expenditures per ruble of construction and installation work	0.24	0.25	0.26
Increase of expenditures as against the level of the preceding year.	0.03	0.01	0.01

The wages at the organizations of the ministry also increased in connection with the increase of the material incentive fund and the payments from it as a result of the exceeding of the assignments on the increase of labor productivity, which is calculated in accordance with the standard value added. For example, during the first half of 1981 the material incentive fund of the ministry was increased by 246,000 rubles due to the exceeding of the plan of the increase of labor productivity in accordance with the standard value added. However, if we calculate the labor productivity in accordance with the prevailing procedure, that is, in accordance with the estimated cost of the performed work, the material incentive fund should have been reduced by 386,000 rubles. All this attests to the need for the more careful analysis of the results of the experiment being conducted on the use of the standard value added and the tightening up of the control of the bank over the expenditure of the wage fund.

The decrease of the overexpenditures of wages also testifies to the need for this. Whereas during the 10th Five-Year Plan their overexpenditures on the performed amount with respect to construction and installation work came on the average to 2.5 percent, during the conducting of the experiment on the standard value added the overexpenditures were reduced considerably and in 1980 and 1981 were from 0.3 to 0.5 percent of the wage fund.

(millions of rubles)

Periods	Fulfillment of plan on construction and installation work			Fulfillment of plan on standard value added		
	plan	actual	percent of fulfillment	plan	actual	percent of fulfillment
1980. .	320.9	300.8	93.7	85.7	84.6	98.7
1981. .	321.7	313.3	97.0	90.4	91.9	101.7

Accordingly there is also a difference in the wage fund, which is due to construction and installation work and the standard value added. In 1980 the wage due for the standard value added exceeded by 2.8 million rubles the wage due for construction and installation work, in 1981 according to preliminary data--by 1.5 million rubles.

Substantial shortcomings occurred during the experiment. The checks, which were made directly by the ministry, as well as the republic State Committee for Construction Affairs and the institutions of the Lithuanian Republic Office of the

All-Union Bank for Financing Capital Investments, repeatedly revealed errors which were committed when making calculations in accordance with the standard value added. The fact that the USSR Ministry of Construction up to now has approved for the republic Ministry of Construction the indicators of the wage, which are not calculated in accordance with the standard value added, is also a shortcoming of the experiment. The indicators on the standard value added are calculated by the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Construction itself, as a result of which it has a planning indicator of the increase of labor productivity according to the standard value added, which has not been approved by a superior organization. It draws up the plan by itself, it also approves the plan by itself.

For the improvement of the conducting of the experiment it is also necessary to invite the USSR Ministry of Construction to establish without fail for the Lithuanian Ministry of Construction the indicator of the amount of the standard value added and to approve the assignment on the increase of labor productivity, which has been calculated in accordance with this indicator.

Substantial shortcomings also continue to occur in the work of the construction organizations of the republic Ministry of Construction. The plans of the placement into operation of a number of most important projects and the assignment on the decrease of the cost of operations and the obtaining of a profit have not been fulfilled. There are a number of factors which lead to these shortcomings.

As was indicated in the materials of the November (1981) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the system of the material and technical supply of construction projects and construction organizations needs considerable improvement. Without this no experiment can yield positive results. Moreover, the use of the indicator of the standard value added at present is not linked with the placement of projects into operation and with the commodity production of construction.

Considerable shortcomings also exist in the conducting of the experiment itself. In the planning estimates of construction projects the indicators of the value added are not singled out by structural components and as a whole, therefore there is no objective criterion of the verification of the correctness of the plan on the standard value added and its fulfillment. At present the Lithuanian Republic Office of the All-Union Bank for Financing Capital Investments is not accepting for financing the planning estimates of construction projects, if the value added is not calculated and indicated in them. It would be very important for the conducting of such an experiment for the USSR Ministry of Construction in consultation with the USSR State Committee for Construction Affairs to elaborate a sounder method of calculating the standard of wages per ruble of the standard value added.

It is also necessary for the use of the standard value added not to hinder the mechanization of individual operations and not to produce a stimulus to perform these operations by hand. It is necessary for the USSR State Committee for Construction Affairs to elaborate more norms and calculations than now on the performance of individual operations by a mechanized means, and to use these calculations extensively when drawing up the estimates for construction work.

The monitoring of the expenditure of the wage funds in construction should be tightened up. At present it is envisaged that in the case of the exceeding (non-fulfillment) of the plan of work the assets for the payment of wages to those

employed in construction and installation work and at ancillary works are issued to the contracting organizations and to the construction projects, which are being carried out by means of the organization's own assets, for each percent of the exceeding (nonfulfillment) of the plan of work according to a standard, which has been calculated on the basis of the level of the wage fund of the piece-rate workers in the total wage fund of the workers, who are employed in construction and installation work and at ancillary works, within the limits of the annual wage fund. This means that starting with the second quarter of 1982 the wages of the administrative and managerial personnel of construction organizations began to be issued in conformity with the fulfillment of the plan on the standard value added.

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LABOR

AGANBEGYAN ANALYZES CURRENT INCENTIVE SYSTEM

Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Dec 82 p 2

[Article by Academician A. Aganbegyan, director of the Institute of the Economics and Organization of Industrial Production of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Siberian Department: "Incentives and Reserves"]

[Text] I will begin with some reminiscences. When I was only new as head of the Institute of the Economics and Organization of Industrial Production, I had to concern myself a great deal with economic questions of gold production, particularly the working of placer deposits. When the content of the placers fell and, given the customary system, developing them was unprofitable, the recovery section was switched to full cost accounting, to the brigade, piece-rate contract, in current terminology.

Previously the placer had supported in the section a chief, shift leaders, foremen, blasters, maintenance workers, in a word, an abundance of people. Wages here were determined in accordance with the list of staff salary rates and bonuses in accordance with established regulations. And all this was barely dependent on the overall result. This was not the case under the piece-rate system. The bulldozer operator is the chief of the section, he is the shift foreman, he is the brigade leader, he is the maintenance worker and so forth.

Why such differences, you ask? Why such a difference in the lists of staff? Well, understandably, given full cost accounting, every superfluous man means additional wages and, consequently, a reduction in the workers' earnings. Who voluntarily wishes to receive less?

But what about the work? This is ultimately the criterion. We have seen for ourselves: in the financially autonomous sections labor productivity is three times higher. In the new organization material incentive has become the decisive factor. The gold miners' work was then paid in accordance with the end result, and the less they lost en route thereto, the more they received. Per gram of gold the amount of the wages of the financially autonomous brigade was half as much as under the old organization, and the production costs of the recovered metal were correspondingly lower also.

I have not recalled this example from my practical experience fortuitously. The fact that in terms of a number of most important indicators the plan quotas for the first 2 years of the 5-year plan were unfulfilled induces serious reflection. Let us ponder the following figures. In the Eighth Five-Year Plan labor productivity in our industry increased 32 percent and in the Ninth 34 percent. The 10th Five-Year Plan produced a growth that was only half as much, from 34 percent to 17 percent. And this was achieved mainly in the period 1976-1978, labor productivity increasing only 2.3 percent in 1979 and 2.7 percent in 1980. The target for labor productivity growth for this 5-year plan was 24 percent. As yet, however, as the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum observed, this indicator is growing at a rate which cannot satisfy us.

And my thoughts turn once again to the mid-1960's. Fifteen years ago an experiment began in the "Azot" Association of Tula Oblast's Shchekinskiy Rayon. Its essence amounted to the simple task of obtaining more output with fewer workers. The association itself has solved many problems since then. The manufacture of output there has tripled and labor productivity has increased fourfold. Another no less striking example. A system was introduced 14 years ago at the Aksay Plastics Plant (Rostov Oblast) which prompted each worker to independently review the labor norms and the consumption of intermediate products and raw materials. Again an achievement: time spent on the manufacture of output has been cut by more than 600,000 norm-hours here and labor productivity has risen by an annual average of 14 percent. In both places wage expenditure per ruble of output has been reduced considerably, although the average wage level has risen. Other enterprises, on the other hand, have been unable to achieve a labor productivity growth rate better than the increase in wages.

So, a complex picture emerges. We have a whole series of successful examples of effective stimulation to highly productive work. At the same time the main indicator of the efficiency of our economy, as labor productivity is, is growing increasingly slowly. What is the reason? Why are the so obvious incentives not "working"?

It is possible to provide incentives to a result only when this result depends on yourself. It transpires at every step with us that a collective is not independent in economic decision-making. With a single telephone call someone from an all-union industrial association could alter this result or a ministry could send out an amended plan. And sometimes an allied subcontractor fails to supply metal and components on time, the railroad does not ship the products, construction workers frustrate the introduction of new capacity.... And none of them fully compensates the damage you have suffered. And that is that. The result to a considerable extent no longer depends on you but on attendant factors. Responsibility for it is beyond your control, and you do not have a chance to provide incentives to it.

The fundamental question of the work of incentives is one of the independence of associations and enterprises as the basic financially autonomous cells of our society and of their responsibility for their economic actions. Correspondingly also, all other tiers of management, higher included, should in terms of the ruble and administratively be responsible for their decisions. In this connection I, as an economist, was deeply impressed by the point expressed at

the CPSU Central Committee November Plenum to the effect that in tackling the question of enterprise and association independence it is time to switch from talk to action.

An important condition of the successful dissemination of all progressive undertakings is a well-founded plan. Take the Shchekino method. To what does it amount? The higher organization determines for the enterprise for 5 years, say, a target for production, the wage fund and so forth. If the collective fulfills this plan with fewer workers, it is permitted to use the economized wage fund for supplementary wages and bonuses. What kind of picture emerges in practice?

More often than not, the plan is changed every year, and each time the wage fund is determined anew here, with regard for what has been achieved. How can there be talk of the Shchekino method here? People have mastered related trades and, thanks to this, have cut back on the number of workers and economized on the wage fund. And then suddenly a stricter plan is determined for the following year with respect to the wage fund. And you have been left without reserves and are in a very difficult position. Are the ministry and all-union industrial association concerned to determine a fixed plan? Could they guarantee the enterprises and organizations that the production plan would be such and such and that the wage fund would be such and such? No, they are not so concerned and cannot guarantee. The point being that the Gosplan, in turn, also does not guarantee them a fixed plan provided with all resources.

A second, more essential point. Having provided a substantiated, stable plan and wage fund for a number of years ahead, the ministry is deprived of room to maneuver and thereby makes life more difficult for itself. For example, some enterprise or other has failed to fulfill the plan and has overspent on the wage fund, not even through its own fault, possibly. What does the ministry do? Loads, at its discretion, the plan quota of other enterprises, the progressive collectives, as a rule. They are sent a supplementary target, the plan is revised upward and stricter indicators are issued with respect to economies in the wage fund in order to reach the overall figures for the sector.

Here is a typical example. At the Omsk Oil Refinery (it is now called the "Omsknefteorgsintez") labor productivity was not growing more than 4 percent a year. After switching to the Shchekino method, it began to increase 8 and more percent a year. That is, the rate doubled. Whereas previously the enterprise had a manpower shortage of 800 men, following transition to the Shchekino method, more than 2,000 men were released (with a simultaneous increase in production). The results were more than gratifying. However, not without the ministry's initiative, an end was put to this experiment. Why? Very simple. It is easier for the ministry this way. It is more convenient for it to set an enterprise a supplementary quota, after all, in this case it can maneuver. The refinery has returned to its own range--in the 5 years of the last 5-year plan productivity increased only 12 percent, and its level has begun to decline even in recent years. Once again there is a manpower shortage. Back to where it started.

So, we have seen for ourselves: a basic prerequisite for incentives to "work" is the existence of a well-founded and stable plan target. Another essential condition is precise material-technical backup. A plan may be given and a project earmarked, but then the construction workers are not supplied with panels, say. And the brigade breaks up.

Any progressive undertaking presupposes a high level of production organization. And a very great deal here depends on material-technical supply. The Volga Auto Plant (VAZ) pay system is often cited as an example. Many people have wished to apply it at their enterprises. The majority have not succeeded. Why? It is not a matter of the pay system. We should not start from this but from the VAZ practice in the broad sense of this concept. How the VAZ absorbed production capacity is an example of organization. Assembly lines for 220,000 autos, 66 seconds--a finished automobile! No one in our country had seen such assembly lines close up. It was new equipment, and the young workers had nowhere to learn because we simply did not have such mechanisms.

It was thus: under these conditions all the facilities were delivered according to a timetable. In 6 months assembly lines, in 9 months the VAZ reaches full rated capacity. Fantasy! What about the organization of maintenance? After all, the VAZ has no reserve backup equipment. If a transfer machine produces some washer or other, it is the sole one of its kind, there is no other such machine. If it stops, "Zhigulis" will not be produced. There are no such malfunctions here. What the reliability of this entire service must be!

Such are some of the economic conditions which determine whether the incentive system performs its assignment--influences an increase in production efficiency. It is also very important which incentive system is applied where.

We say: the brigade contract, the Shchekino method, the Aksay experiment. What is behind this? Increased productivity, better use of equipment, economized raw material and fuel. I would like to pay particular attention to these latter factors.

For many works a ton of raw material saved is far more significant than the release of a worker. Thus what is it most profitable to encourage? The intention would seemingly suggest itself: apply the system which would encourage everything. But upon a more detailed study one understands that this is a loophole for obtaining money whose destination is not known. It is possible to overload the plan, and you will be given a bonus for efficiency promotion, you failed to meet the target for new equipment, but excelled in the manufacture of old products and pocketed six salaries. All these shortcomings are removable if the incentive is derived from the gross income.

I will show this in the example of the financially autonomous brigade which I described at the start of the article.

A certain price is determined for a product. Outlays on materials, fuel, electric power, rental equipment and so forth are deducted from the sum total which is received. In accordance with the labor participation factor, the rest is shared among the brigade members.

Why is the system good? Let us assume a bulldozer operator leaves his engine running overnight, not wanting to warm it up. Thirty liters of solar oil is R3 per day and in a month--R90: we deduct them from the pocket of each. Is it not very much to one's disadvantage? But there could also be other types of expenditure. For example, you have rented a tractor, and it costs. The rent is already R1,000 here. From the pocket once again. In short, under this system everyone will watch to ensure that nothing is spent to no purpose, including the working minute. That such an attitude should be a general principle is another matter. But we once again return to control of the ruble. Where this exists, the individual and the state as a whole benefits, where it is absent, the whole country pays for the negligent management of individuals.

I would not wish to be understood as urging a transition to remuneration on the basis of gross income for all without exception, as they say. But this is one way to effect a cardinal move toward intensification and a sharp spurt in an increase in labor productivity.

I would like in conclusion to touch on some problems of a relatively delicate nature. We speak of an improvement in material incentive and mean by this money. But is it only this which participates in the incentive system today?

I know people who have turned down a new job offered them with a difference in earnings of R30-40. The reason? They are doing what they like best, there is a good atmosphere in the collective, getting to work by public transport is quick and convenient and so forth.

Or another question: the possibility of displaying more initiative in the everyday sphere. Take a taxicab, say. One often stands and waits for a taxi, but there are none. There is a shortage of cars and drivers. At the same time, however, there are sufficient "privates" (excuse the jargon). And if it were permitted to conclude contracts with car owners on partial assistance to our taxi fleets (with tax being withheld for the state here, naturally)? Who would lose? No one, I believe.

There is the same problem with small stores. After all, with the current practice there is a manager and an accountant and so on and so forth. Why not try on a contractual basis (again with the payment of rent to the state) leasing all this? Of course, such mini-service centers would operate under state control, but the more flexible incentive system would afford an opportunity for raising the quality of their operation and, from being unprofitable, make them efficient....

It will seem to some people that my proposals are hardly applicable to a socialist country. But I am, after all, speaking about forms of stimulation under state control, without the enlistment of wage workers. And then all this is operating and has given a good account of itself in a number of socialist countries. We must ponder and propose. And, what is most important, find forms of the working people's maximum participation in an improvement in the efficiency of our economy and the search for additional sources of an increase in well-being. It should be only thus. And not otherwise.

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LABOR

SPECIAL ASSISTANCE TO AZERI WORKERS IN SOVIET FAR EAST

Baku VYSHKA in Russian 31 Dec 82 p 3

[Article by Yu. Bunyatov, deputy chairman of the AzSSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems]: "The Amur Lands Are Waiting"]

[Text] /"In April 1982 we left Azerbaijan and came to settle in the Mikhaylovskiy Rayon of Amur Oblast at the Pribrezhnyy Sovkhoz. We were well received and immediately provided with work. I am now working as a carpenter, while my wife is employed as a milkmaid at the sovkhoz. They allotted us a cow, pigs, and chickens. We have a fine new house, and a plot for growing vegetables. This year we grew five tons of potatoes. We have four children, and they are all studying in school without any difficulties. My average monthly wages amount to 280--290 rubles, while those of my wife range from 250 to 260 rubles. We intend to put our name on the waiting list to obtain an automobile. All our comrades who came here with us are living well. Some of them are working as machine operators, while others are employed as builders."

This latter was sent from the far-off Amur Oblast to the AzSSR Goskomtrud by Nazirov Khanlar Mamed ogly, a former inhabitant of our republic. Along with other families from various cities and rayons of Azerbaijan, his family left in April of this year to take up permanent residence in Amur Oblast. In connection with this, the editorial office is receiving letters with requests to tell them again about the goal and purpose of such re-settlements, about the natural-climate and economic conditions in Amur Oblast, about the re-settlement procedure and the privileges being granted to the re-settlers./ [in boldface]

One of the most important factors ensuring the dynamic and well-proportioned development of social production and the increase of its socio-economic effectiveness is the rational utilization of labor resources. Throughout the country, and particularly in our republic, a great deal of work is being conducted along these lines. Nevertheless, the task of increasing the effectiveness of utilizing labor resources still remains urgent for us. In many regions of the Soviet Union manpower shortages are now to be observed. At the same time, as calculations have shown, with respect to the growth rate of labor resources, Azerbaijan now and in the future will rank among the top places in the country.

The rayon has 16 general-education schools, 28 houses of culture and clubs, 20 libraries, 5 hospitals, 24 physicians'-assistant and maternity centers and children's sanatoriums. Each village has communications departments, reception centers for the production administration of the everyday services to the population.

The wages on the kolkhozes and sovkhoses are of the piece-rate plus bonus type. Added to the basic wage is the Amur coefficient, and, when this is taken into account, the average monthly wages comprise the following: for machine operators 244 rubles, livestock-raising workers--213 workers, construction workers --200 rubles, unskilled laborers--153 rubles.

The Oktyab'skiy Rayon is located at a distance of 140 km from the oblast center, the city of Blagoveshchensk. The re-settlement area is located in the north-eastern part of the rayon, covered in places with scrub-brush, while the south-western part consists of a plains-type steppe with chernozem soil. As is also the case in this oblast's other rayons, there is a broad network here of cultural-everyday-service and educational institutions.

The rayon has 12 sovkhoses and 3 kolkhozes. The wages therein are of the piece-rate plus bonus type. Added to the basic wage is the 20-percent Far Eastern coefficient. Other increments are applied to the wages. Thus, first- and second-class tractor- and machine-operators are paid increments for these high classes.

The average monthly wages come to the following amounts: for mechanics, 200--260 rubles, production workers, 150--180 rubles, drivers, 160--180 rubles, construction workers, 180--200 rubles, and for unskilled laborers, 130--140 rubles per month.

All the populated centers in Amur Oblast have electricity and radios. Television broadcasts are received by means of the "Orbit" system from Moscow.

On their farms the workers and office employees have cattle, pigs, and poultry, on the garden-plots near their houses they grow potatoes and vegetables, and those who are fond of doing so cultivate orchards and engage in beekeeping.

Accepted for re-settlement to Amur Oblast are families including at least two able-bodied members suitable for physical work directly in agricultural production. As an exception, re-settlement is permitted for military personnel who have been released into the reserves or into retirement and who have no families, but this must be done within the space of one year from the time of this release.

Various privileges have been established for the new settlers. Families accepted for re-settlement are granted free transportation for themselves as well as for their belongings in an amount of up to two tons per family; they are likewise paid a simultaneous monetary grant as follows: 200 rubles to the head of the family and 75 rubles for each family member regardless of age. The procedure for paying out the monetary grant is as follows: 50 percent when the settler leaves the place of departure, and the remaining 50 percent

A correct, objective consideration of this circumstance is one of the most important tasks of national-economic planning and the implementation of an effective demographic policy. Our international duty is to render aid by means of labor resources to other regions of the country where manpower shortages are felt.

Within the framework of the planned manpower shifts since 1982 a movement of families has been begun from Azerbaijan to the Amur Oblast of the RSFSR; this is being carried out in accordance with the plan for the economic and social development of the AzSSR's national economy for the years 1981--1985.

The climate of the Amur Oblast is sharply continental; during the winter it gets down to 20° and, in the northern regions, even 40° below freezing, while in the summer it is warm, with temperatures of 20°-30° above 0° Centigrade. But with a great number of windless, sunny days and low air humidity it is easily borne by people and animals. The annual amount of precipitation ranges up to 600 mm, and it falls primarily during the warm, summertime period.

The soil and climate conditions allow for the cultivation of high harvest yields of grain crops here; well-established Amur crops include soybeans, vegetables, potatoes, corn, and perennial grasses.

The settlers from our republic are being distributed among farms in the Mikhaylovskiy, Tambovskiy, and Oktyabr'skiy Rayons of Amur Oblast.

The Mikhaylovskiy Rayon has an extensive network of cultural-daily-life institutions; there are 10 secondary, 3 eight-year, and 8 primary schools in operation here. All the schools have extended-day groups. Operating in the rayon center are a children's music school, evening and correspondence schools for working youth, and a standard-model hospital, furnished with up-to-date equipment. All the villages are linked with the rayon center by bus transport. A great deal of housing construction is carried out every year. The central areas of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes have standard-model dining-rooms, the network of kindergartens and nurseries is being expanded, and daily services are being improved.

The workers' wages on the rayon's sovkhozes are of the piece-rate plus bonus type. Added to the basic wage is the Far-Eastern coefficient and an increment for a constant work-service period in a given enterprise. Taking this into account, the average monthly wages consist of the following amounts: for machine-operators 270 rubles, livestock-raising workers--230 rubles, construction workers--300 rubles, and unskilled laborers--170 rubles.

The Tambov Rayon is situated in the southern part of Amur Oblast. The topography is level; there are many lakes and man-made reservoirs here. This rayon has 10 kolkhozes, 4 sovkhozes, and an experimental-production farm of the All-Russian NIIsoi [Scientific Research Institute on Soybeans]. The farms have many tractors, combines, and other equipment; there are also standard-model repair-machine shops and garages for motor vehicles. Heavy-duty grain facilities have been built on all the farms to process the grain and soybeans. On the livestock-raising farms the labor-intensive processes have been mechanized.

The rayon has 16 general-education schools, 28 houses of culture and clubs, 20 libraries, 5 hospitals, 24 physicians'-assistant and maternity centers and children's sanatoriums. Each village has communications departments, reception centers for the production administration of the everyday services to the population.

The wages on the kolkhozes and sovkhoses are of the piece-rate plus bonus type. Added to the basic wage is the Amur coefficient, and, when this is taken into account, the average monthly wages comprise the following: for machine operators 244 rubles, livestock-raising workers--213 workers, construction workers --200 rubles, unskilled laborers--153 rubles.

The Oktyab'skiy Rayon is located at a distance of 140 km from the oblast center, the city of Blagoveshchensk. The re-settlement area is located in the north-eastern part of the rayon, covered in places with scrub-brush, while the south-western part consists of a plains-type steppe with chernozem soil. As is also the case in this oblast's other rayons, there is a broad network here of cultural-everyday-service and educational institutions.

The rayon has 12 sovkhoses and 3 kolkhozes. The wages therein are of the piece-rate plus bonus type. Added to the basic wage is the 20-percent Far Eastern coefficient. Other increments are applied to the wages. Thus, first- and second-class tractor- and machine-operators are paid increments for these high classes.

The average monthly wages come to the following amounts: for mechanics, 200--260 rubles, production workers, 150--180 rubles, drivers, 160--180 rubles, construction workers, 180--200 rubles, and for unskilled laborers, 130--140 rubles per month.

All the populated centers in Amur Oblast have electricity and radios. Television broadcasts are received by means of the "Orbit" system from Moscow.

On their farms the workers and office employees have cattle, pigs, and poultry, on the garden-plots near their houses they grow potatoes and vegetables, and those who are fond of doing so cultivate orchards and engage in beekeeping.

Accepted for re-settlement to Amur Oblast are families including at least two able-bodied members suitable for physical work directly in agricultural production. As an exception, re-settlement is permitted for military personnel who have been released into the reserves or into retirement and who have no families, but this must be done within the space of one year from the time of this release.

Various privileges have been established for the new settlers. Families accepted for re-settlement are granted free transportation for themselves as well as for their belongings in an amount of up to two tons per family; they are likewise paid a simultaneous monetary grant as follows: 200 rubles to the head of the family and 75 rubles for each family member regardless of age. The procedure for paying out the monetary grant is as follows: 50 percent when the settler leaves the place of departure, and the remaining 50 percent

--after the family has worked steadily and lived for a year on a farm in the place of settlement.

The families of the new settlers are freed from paying an agricultural tax or an income tax levied on incomes from agriculture for a period of eight years.

The farms in the settlement places also grant certain specific privileges to the settlers who have arrived. In particular, the sovkhozes grant the families of new settlers separate houses or apartments, garden plots near their houses, relieve them from paying apartment rent for a period of two years after they settle in, and grant them free fuel and community services in accordance with existing norms. The sovkhozes must sell to such families at cost, but no higher than the requisition prices, cows from the basic herd, and render assistance in providing cattle with feed and pasture. The sovkhoz preserves for workers and office employees who have arrived in order to settle an uninterrupted labor-service record, if the break in their work in connection with the re-settlement does not exceed one month, not counting the time spent in traveling to the place of settlement. The kolkhozes also render analogous services to the new settlers.

USSR Gosbank grants to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes credits for the construction of apartment houses with barnyard facilities and for the settlers' families in amounts and under the conditions for liquidating these credits by means of state budgetary funds, those of the farm, and the settlers' own funds. For example, in order to build a house, it is proposed to allocate 12,000 rubles, of which 5,000 will be repaid by means of the state budget, 5,000 by the farm, and only 2,000 rubles by the family. The amounts of credit available to buy cattle comprise 600 rubles, of which the re-settling family will pay out only 200 rubles.

New settlers who have been expelled from kolkhozes and sovkhozes or who leave their jobs without proper reasons prior to the expiration of a 10-year period from the day of settlement, in accordance with special decisions, must either turn over to the farms the houses constructed by means of credit and the cattle obtained with the aid of credit (herein the farm returns to the settlers the amount paid by them to liquidate the indebtedness), or reimburse the expenditures for building the houses and obtaining cattle, provided by means of the state budget and the means of the farm in question.

New settlers who have been expelled or who leave their jobs without proper reasons prior to the expiration of a five-year period from the day of settlement, furthermore, are obliged to reimburse the state for the same monetary grant obtained by them, the cost of moving to the place of settlement, as well as the cost of moving their belongings.

Settlers from all the regions of our country, members of many nationalities, are living and working on a friendly manner in Amur Oblast. In carrying out their international duty, families from Azerbaijan merged into this friendly family at the beginning of 1982. From the very first days many of them showed themselves to be genuine workers, and they became the leading production workers in their groups. In March of next year dozens of more families from

Azerbaijan are scheduled to re-settle in Amur Oblast.

There is a need in Amur Oblast for people in all the agricultural occupations--tractor drivers, combine operators, milkmaids, cowherds, swineherds, and others. The contribution of the Azerbaijani people to the mastery of Amur Oblast's fertile lands will certainly be a notable one.

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LABOR

SUPPLEMENTARY WAGES FOR SOVKHOZ ANIMAL HUSBANDRY WORKERS

Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 9, Feb 83 p 14

[Text] The USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and the AUCCTU Presidium have approved instructions governing the procedure and conditions of the payment of supplementary wages for continuous service on a given farm for workers of sovkhozes and other state agricultural enterprises employed in animal husbandry. We carry the text.

Amount of Supplement for Length of Service on a Given Farm

1. Supplementary wages for unbroken service on a given farm determined by CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers and AUCCTU decree 436 of 24 May 1982 "Additional Measures To Retain on the Kolkhozes, Sovkhozes and Other Agricultural Enterprises Workers Employed In Animal Husbandry" are paid to workers of sovkhozes and other state agricultural enterprises* employed in animal husbandry (other than shepherds and herdsmen of sovkhozes using desert, semidesert and mountain pasture, "Black Land" outlying pasture and Kizlyar pasture) in the following percentage amounts of total annual wages:

<u>To those who have worked continuously on a given sovkhoz</u>	<u>In areas of Siberia and the Far East and the virgin land areas of Kazakhstan, the Urals and the Volga region</u>	<u>In other areas</u>
From 2 to 5 years	12	8
From 5 to 10 years	15	10
From 10 to 15 years	20	13
Fifteen years and over	25	16

For shepherds and herdsmen of sovkhozes using desert, semidesert and mountain pasture, "Black Land" outlying pasture and Kizlyar pasture the supplement for continuous service on a given sovkhoz is paid in the following amounts:

* Henceforward sovkhozes and other state agricultural enterprises are called "sovkhozes".

<u>To those who have worked continuously on a given sovkhov</u>	<u>As a percentage of the total annual wage</u>
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From 2 to 5 years	12
From 5 to 10 years	15
From 10 to 15 years	20
Fifteen years and over	25

The supplement for length of service on a given sovkhov is paid once a year.

The supplement for length of service is paid to workers employed in animal husbandry (the list of operations and occupations affording the right to obtain the supplements is appended) and also to leaders and assistant leaders of animal husbandry brigades and composite brigades engaged in animal husbandry.

Computation of Length of Service Affording the Right to Obtain the Supplements

2. The length of service of workers employed in animal husbandry affording the right to obtain supplementary wages for work on a given sovkhov includes:

a) work in animal husbandry and also temporary work at the discretion of the sovkhov administration in other work on a given sovkhov.

For persons working on 1 January 1983 in animal husbandry the entire period of work in animal husbandry on a given sovkhov, irrespective of interruptions in the work, is counted. If a worker was not working on 1 January 1983 in animal husbandry in connection with his transfer to other work at the discretion of the administration, the entire period of his previous work in animal husbandry on a given sovkhov is counted in his length of service affording the right to obtain the supplements upon his return to work in animal husbandry. For workers working in animal husbandry on sovkhoves of virgin land areas and where new land is being developed the period of work in animal husbandry on sovkhoves where they worked prior to their departure for virgin land areas and those where new land is being developed is also counted in the length of service on a given sovkhov affording the right to the supplement;

b) the period of work in the tractor driver-machine operator occupation on a given sovkhov if it was immediately followed by work in animal husbandry;

c) the period of actual compulsory military service upon starting work in animal husbandry on a given sovkhov no later than 3 months (not counting travel time) from the day of discharge;

d) the period of service during the Great Patriotic War in the USSR Armed Forces, partisan detachments and the local defense force upon starting work following demobilization in animal husbandry on a given sovkhov;

e) a period of work abroad on condition of a return to the previous place of work in animal husbandry no later than 2 months after the return from abroad, not counting travel time to the place of permanent work;

f) the period of tuition in vocational-technical educational institutions and at worker training, retraining and improvement courses with time off from work if work in animal husbandry on a given sovkhos directly follows the course of study by not more than 3 months;

g) the period of work in elective office in party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol organizations if this work is directly followed by work in animal husbandry and if the interval between the completion of the work in the elective office and the work in animal husbandry is not in excess of 3 months.

h) the period of work in people's (party-state) control bodies (with the exception of work in operational maintenance and servicing positions) if it is directly followed by work in animal husbandry and if the interval between the work in the people's (party-state) bodies and the work in animal husbandry is not in excess of 3 months; and

i) the period of supplementary maternity leave granted women in accordance with current legislation and also the period of women's work in jobs which do not afford the right to obtain supplements for length of service if they are temporarily transferred to these jobs in connection with pregnancy or the breast-feeding of a child and were prior to the transfer employed in work in animal husbandry.

3. The period of work not only on an operating sovkhos but also on one (on a kolkhoz included) which has been liquidated or reorganized and on whose basis a given sovkhos has been created is taken into account when computing the length of service.

4. The length of service computed in accordance with clauses 2 and 3 of these instructions on 1 January 1983 is preserved in the period of subsequent work on condition that it be continuous. A worker who has left his job in animal husbandry on a given sovkhos after 1 January 1983 and subsequently returned to a job in animal husbandry forfeits the term of previous work affording the right to obtain supplements for length of service except for the instances indicated in clause 5 of these instructions.

5. The length of service of workers employed in animal husbandry is continuous, but this term does not include the period of interruptions in instances of:

a) the worker's transfer at the discretion of a higher organization from a sovkhos where payment of a supplement for length of service has been established to one on which this supplement has also been established;

b) the worker's migration in planned fashion from a sovkhos where the payment of a supplement for length of service has been established to another sovkhos on which this supplement has been established if the interruption in work in connection with the migration is not more than 1 month (not counting the time spent in travel to the new place of work);

c) starting work within a month after a period of temporary incapacity for work which lasted over 4 months and which caused dismissal or a period of disability

if the worker has returned to work in animal husbandry on a given sovkhos or taken a job in animal husbandry on another sovkhos, irrespective of the place of work in the period of disability, and also in the event of a return to work in animal husbandry following transfer in accordance with the findings of a medical-labor expert commission (MLEC) or medical advice commission (MAC) to other work;

d) starting work on a sovkhos where payment of the supplement for length of service has been established after an interruption caused by release in connection with the liquidation of a sovkhos and a reduction in the numbers or established list of workers if the interruption in work is not more than 1 month, not counting travel time;

e) transfer to work on another sovkhos where a supplement for length of service has been established in cases where a job in animal husbandry cannot be made available on this sovkhos. The impossibility of work being made available in animal husbandry to be corroborated by a certificate from the sovkhos administration;

f) transfer to work on a sovkhos where a supplement for length of service has been established in connection with the transfer of the husband (wife) if the interruption in work is not more than 1 month, not counting travel time;

g) a job being taken in animal husbandry by pensioners who worked in animal husbandry prior to their retirement; and

h) the transfer of a worker employed in animal husbandry to other permanent work at the discretion of the sovkhos administration and his subsequent return to a job in animal husbandry.

6. A period of corrective work at the place of work, a period of detention for petty hooliganism and also a period of work not affording the right to obtain a supplement for length of service to which a worker has been transferred by way of disciplinary punishment are not counted in the term affording the right to obtain a supplement but also do not interrupt it.

7. The supplement for length of service for workers employed in animal husbandry is computed on the basis of their wages paid for work done and for output, extra pay for a combination of occupations, expansion of the servicing zone and fulfillment of a prescribed volume of work with fewer workers, total bonuses in accordance with current regulations governing the payment of bonuses and extra pay for the "Master of Animal Husbandry" title and on the basis of average earnings paid during leave.

For pensioners who have returned to a job in animal husbandry the supplement for length of service is computed in the amount (as a percentage of earnings) fixed by the time of retirement on the basis of the worker's actual earnings in a given year obtained for work in animal husbandry.

8. Upon a worker employed in animal husbandry acquiring the right to obtain a supplement for length of service in the course of the calendar year the

supplement is computed on the basis of the wages paid since acquisition of the right to obtain this supplement.

For workers employed in animal husbandry who in the course of the calendar year acquire the right to an increase in the supplement for the length of service the sum total of the supplement for the year is determined by way of summing up the supplements computed in the corresponding amounts per period of the year.

9. For workers employed in animal husbandry who have left work affording the right to obtain a supplement for length of service in accordance with the findings of the MAC or MLEC in connection with illness or disability, callup for (start of) military service, transfer to elective work, departure for training, retirement and departure from the job in connection with childbirth and for families of deceased workers with the right to obtain a supplement for length of service the supplement for length of service is computed on the basis of the earnings paid in a given year prior to discharge from the job.

Upon the transfer of workers employed in animal husbandry at the discretion of a higher organization to a job in animal husbandry on another sovkhos the supplement for length of service is paid proportionate to the earnings for the period worked on each farm.

For the remaining workers employed in animal husbandry who left the job on a given sovkhos prior to the start of the time of payment the supplement for length of service is not paid.

10. Sovkhos leaders are given the right to reduce to 25 percent the amount of the supplement for length of service for workers who have been absent without valid reason at the time of the payment for the year in which the absenteeism occurred if other disciplinary measures have not been applied.

A reduction in the amount of the supplement is announced in an order of the sovkhos leader giving the reasons for this.

11. Upon computation of the average earnings maintained for a worker in accordance with current legislation (during leave, performance of public and official duties, at the time of temporary incapacity and such) the supplement for length of service is not taken into account.

The supplement for length of service is incorporated in the earnings from which the pension and compensation for physical injury to workers or other damage to the health connected with their job are computed.

Procedure of the Determination of the Term Affording the Right to the Payment of the Supplement for Length of Service

12. The length of service on a given sovkhos is determined by a commission made up of the sovkhos leader, the worker in charge of personnel, the chief accountant and a representative of the trade union committee.

13. The basic document for determination of the term is the labor book.

Length of service in animal husbandry not established by entries in the labor book may be corroborated by properly validated papers bearing the signatures of the leaders of the appropriate enterprises issued on the basis of personnel registration documents or time sheets and other documents confirming a given person's term of work.

In the event of the absence of papers confirming the work and the impossibility of restoring these papers the term may be established by the testimony of no less than two persons. In this case the commission must demand of the appropriate enterprises official confirmation of destruction of the archives.

The testimony is given in written form only by persons who have worked together with the worker whose term is being established. The signature of the witness is attested by the leader of the sovkhos, and if the witness is not working, the signature must be notarized. The testimony of family as witnesses is not permitted.

14. The findings of the commission concerning determination of the length of service in animal husbandry are recorded in a protocol. Copies of the commission's findings in triplicate properly validated (authenticated by the enterprise's seal) are issued thus: one to the accounts department for computation of the supplement and one to the worker, and the third is inserted in the worker's personal file.

15. Complaints about the commission's findings are examined by the higher management and trade union authorities in accordance with sovkhos jurisdiction, and their decisions are final.

It has been determined that the said supplementary wages for continuous service be introduced:

in areas of Siberia, the Far East, the Urals and the Nonchernozem zone of the RSFSR and in the Central-Nonchernozem area of the RSFSR as of 1 January 1983;

in other parts of the RSFSR and in the Ukrainian SSR, the Belorussian SSR, the Kazakh SSR, the Lithuanian SSR, the Moldavian SSR, the Latvian SSR and the Estonian SSR as of 1 January 1984; and

in the remaining parts of the country as of 1 January 1985.

With the introduction for workers of sovkhoses and other state agricultural enterprises employed in animal husbandry of supplementary wages for continuous service on a given sovkhos within the times determined by CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers and AUCCTU decree 436 of 24 May 1982 clauses 5 and 6 of the model regulations governing the pay of workers of sovkhoses and other state agricultural enterprises ratified by decree 135/P-4 of the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and the AUCCTU Presidium of 8 May 1981 and the instructions on the procedure of the payment of a supplement for length of service per specialty on a given farm to shepherds of sovkhoses and other state agricultural enterprises using desert, semidesert and mountain pasture and also outlying "Black Land" pasture and Kizlyar pasture ratified by decree 185/19 of the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and the AUCCTU Secretariat of 13 July 1972 are not applied.

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